Statistics of How Many Families Split After Men Came Home From Vietnam Prison
STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE
Affiliate vi
Statistics Of
Vietnamese Democide
Estimates, Calculations, And Sources *
By R.J. Rummel
Tables 6.1A and 6.1B give the sources, estimates and calculations of Vietnamese killed. As noted, Vietnam was involved in several wars and was for twenty-one years formally divided into ii nation-states, North and S Vietnam. Moreover, both parts of Vietnam committed democide against their own people too as in other countries, and democide was committed by foreigners confronting them. Not only is Vietnam's history complex, therefore, but the estimates of those killed in war and democide differ considerably past perpetrator, victims, fourth dimension, and identify. For these reasons I have made a special attempt to divide the estimates into the smallest consistent groups and where possible to use the resulting consolidated figures to cross check totals and subtotals.
This will exist seen, for example, in computing the total war-dead (lines 1 to 261 in Table 6.1A). The first state of war was that against the French, defined here as offset when the Viet Minh established the Democratic Democracy of Vietnam in September 1945 and lasting until July 1954. I divide estimates of war-dead and their calculations or consolidations into those for the Viet Minh (lines 3 to iv), France (lines vii to 18), civilians (lines 22 to 25), military (lines 28 to 30), and total war-dead (lines 33 to 44). The full state of war-dead is the figure of involvement here, simply before accepting its consolidation (line 44) it can be checked against two other ways of getting the full. One is by adding together the separately determined figures for Viet Minh, French, and noncombatant state of war-dead (line 45); the other by adding civilian and military war-dead (line 46). This gives us iii total state of war dead ranges for comparing (lines 44 to 46). The 3 mid-values tend to be relatively shut, while the lows and highs are quite divergent. Since nosotros generally want the higher high and lower depression, I selected these for the concluding total and averaged the three mid-values (line 47). Subtracting so the non-Vietnamese war-dead (line 49) gives the cost of the Indochina War as 188,000 to 1,153,000, or 512,000 Vietnamese lives.
War-dead estimates for the Vietnam War abound (lines 53 to 214). I dissever these commencement into civilian and total war-dead for Northward Vietnam and consolidate them (lines 54 to 67). And then I pull out estimates for Viet Cong state of war-dead (which may or may not also include North Vietnamese regulars--lines 69 to 83) and I requite separately those estimates explicitly for both Due north Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-expressionless (lines 88 to 102). For both sets the estimates vary in the years and duration they cover. Accordingly, ignoring estimates for ane year or those whose periods or coverage are unclear, I extrapolated the estimates for the years of the war. That is,
extrapolated estimate = (years of war)(estimate/years information technology covers).
Since many estimates hither and later will be so extrapolated, the date taken for the beginning of the war is statistically of import. I selected January 1960 based on those considerations given in Decease By Government.
However, the war was not equally violent and deadly for each of these years. It was far less intense in the early years than after the full American involvement in 1965. To have into account this possible shift in violence, therefore, I calculated three extrapolations for each estimate, where I made "years of war" successively equal to 12, 13, and 14. Even and so this may seem to under or overly weight the estimates, especially for the early on 1960s before the Us was fully involved; or those for the period of greatest violence during 1966 to 1969. In any case, I will afterwards check on these results past comparing them against total war-dead estimates.
Returning at present to Table 6.1A and the consolidation of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead estimates and extrapolations (line 102), this may be checked against those consolidations of the dissever state of war-expressionless estimates and extrapolations (line 67 and 83) by summing them (line 104). Every bit tin can be seen, the two different ways of determining N Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead yield roughly equal mid and high totals. For a preliminary war-dead range, I take the everyman low and highest high and average the two mid-values (line 105). This is preliminary since in the light of subsequent figures for war-deaths among South Vietnamese and other forces, it may have to be adjusted.
I follow similar procedures to determine a preliminary Due south Vietnamese state of war-dead range (lines 108 to 140). Note that the two ways of estimating this range (lines 138 and 139) yield fairly close mid and high totals, but still must be treated with caution. Unlike with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-expressionless estimates mostly, civilian and total war-dead statistics for South Vietnam are non always clear as to whether they also cover democide. I have tried to separate out the ambiguous estimates, merely sometimes this demands reading the mind of the source (e.g., lines 109, 132, 134). Fifty-fifty if labeled "war-dead" the gauge may cover all killed during the war, which would include democide (east.chiliad., possibly line 133). In whatsoever case, keeping this in mind, I calculate a preliminary Southward Vietnamese state of war-dead full as I did for Northward Vietnam and the Viet Cong (line 140).
Largely uncontroversial state of war-dead totals then are calculated for Due south Vietnam's allies (lines 142 to 179--the three estimates for South Vietnam and allies on lines 182 to 184 are for groundwork only).
Finally I can calculate an overall war-dead total. I list related estimates and their consolidations for civilians (lines 188 to 193), military (lines 196 to 199), and combined (lines 202 to 206), and then check the latter by ii sums. One is that of the divide civilian and armed forces consolidations (line 207); the other is of the preliminary North Vietnam/Viet Cong, Southward Vietnam, Usa, and other third party sub-totals (line 208). The three mid-values (lines 206 to 208) are relatively close, while ane low is about a 3rd lower than the others. Consequent with my approach, I take this depression and the highest loftier to institute the final range. Its mid-value is the average of the three culling mid-values (line 209). Subtracting strange dead from this (line 210) gives a likely Vietnam War, state of war-dead total of 1,719,000 people (line 211). Since this is not the figure to which the preliminary North Vietnamese/Viet Cong and South Vietnamese war-dead figures summed, they must exist adjusted such that they add up to this total. Proportionally adjusting them gives the final ranges and mid-values shown (lines 212 and 214).
Both Due north Vietnam and S Vietnam were involved in other wars and suffered rebellions of one-sort or some other. In South Vietnam there was the suppression of various sects and their independent armies (line 219), rebellions of minorities (lines 222 to 223), the pre-Vietnam War communist inspired guerrilla war directed by Due north Vietnam from 1954 through 1959 (lines 227 and 228), and the incursion into Cambodia (line 239). For N Vietnam there was a severe local rebellion in 1957 (line 232); and the rebellion of South. Vietnamese against N Vietnam cadre and past National Liberation Forepart guerrillas after the Vietnam War (lines 233 to 235). And at that place was North Vietnam's war in Cambodia (lines 240 to 242), state of war in Laos (line 246), and war against People's republic of china (lines 249 to 254). Totaling the consolidated estimates (line 258) and adding this to the other war-dead total gives an overall toll for the years 1945 to 1987 of 1,336,000 to 3,960,000, or a likely 2,509,000 Vietnamese (line 261). This was nearly 7 per centum of the mid-menstruation population (line 867), or roughly one out of 14 people
Finally, nosotros can turn to democide. That for Northward Vietnam involved in the early years a terror devoted to eliminating non-communist nationalists, anti-communists, and those who were pro-French (lines 266 to 275). Once the state of war against the French was almost over Hanoi turned to destroying and rebuilding the rural economic and ability structure. This period, from 1953 to 1956, is very meaning and the estimates are very confused. I accept appropriately outlined in the tabular array all the estimates associated with it so that the mode of calculation and associated subtotals for this period can be clearly distinguished.
Amongst the first campaigns was that to "reduce rent," which really involved ridding the countryside of rich, powerful, and bourgeois peasants. (line 279). There is merely one estimate of the associated democide, and for it the source (Hoang Van Chi, a Vietnamese nationalist with first hand experience) cites Professor Gerard Tongas who was in Hanoi during these years (he left in 1959), and which he claims to exist accurate.
In one case this campaign was completed and the countryside softened up, "state reform" proper took place (this was the taking of state from those who endemic more than a defined corporeality and giving it to landless peasants-- a preliminary to full nationalization of the land). In that location are major problems in estimating those who were killed or died in the campaign. The estimates cover dissimilar periods; and some cover strictly the "land reform" entrada while others appear to mix up the "rent reduction" campaign with the "land reform" or "political struggle" campaigns, with on going repression and retaliation (lines 312 to 318), or with democide associated with the suppression of rebellions (lines 322 to 325). I endeavor to handle this by dividing "state reform" estimates in terms of their ostensive inclusiveness. Thus I offset present estimates of "executions" (lines 282 to 288); and so those executed and otherwise "killed" (lines 292 to 298); and and then those who too otherwise died (i.e., "dead"--lines 302 to 308), such as those tagged as wealthy peasants who were deprived of their land, officially ostracized and thus denied food and shelter. Consequently, in consolidating the "land reform" dead (line 309), I fabricated sure that the figures subsumed the consolidated killed estimates (line 299), that this in plow subsumed the consolidated execution estimates (line 289), and that this subsumed the hire reduction killed (line 279). In determining the final democide "state reform" total, I only added the final "land reform" dead (line 309) to those killed in political struggle, etc. (line 319), and the suppression of uprisings (line 326). The probable democide for this four year flow then totals 283,000 Northward Vietnamese (line 329).
Only then there was also those who died in prison or at forced labor from 1945 to 1956. One guess of 500,000 dead (line 335) from President Nixon, which may take been based on hugger-mugger intelligence estimates, cannot exist accustomed without some publicly available confirming information or like contained estimates. Based on other estimates of the prison house/camp population I assumed a l,000 military camp population per year and an unnatural death rate of 2 per centum per year, on par with the Chinese rate
And then also there were the POWs from the French Expeditionary Force that were killed. Based on the sources,
Putting together all these consolidations and calculations, I figure that for the years 1945 to 1956 the Vietnamese communists likely killed 242,000 to 922,000 people (line 347). Above this range I show two other estimates of these dead (lines 344 and 345), i at 700,000 and the other at 500,000 dead. Both are contained inside the range at which I arrived.
Through torture, executions, and incarceration the French also committed democide during the Indochina State of war. Although while hints of this are given in the sources, there is not plenty data to fifty-fifty estimate a minimum. We can however count the Vietnamese killed when a French heavy cruiser shelled the civilian areas of Haiphong (lines 350 to 357) and add the consolidated range (line 358) in with the full democide (line 364).
I tin can now give a summary of the democide for this period (lines 361 to 365).
As to the 1954 to 1975 menses, democide continued in North Vietnam (lines 370 to 371) and there is one approximate of information technology available for 1956 to 1959 from Todd Culbertson, a member of the Editorial Page staff of the Richmond Virginia News Leader. He does not justify or give his sources for this approximate. I guess that the 1956 portion of this estimate includes executions associated with political repression, rebellions, and the concluding year of "land reform." These may business relationship for half or more of the estimate and the consolidated range takes this into business relationship. Without giving figures, Bernard Fall (line 371) gives substance to the Culbertson estimate in his word of the execution of intellectuals over the years 1956-1960 as a effect of the "hundred flowers" entrada like to that carried out by Mao in China.
The rest of the estimates for this catamenia are for North Vietnam'southward democide in South Vietnam during the pre-Vietnam War guerrilla struggle, during the war itself, and in Cambodia (lines 374-472). It is now clear from documents available since the end of the Vietnam War (similar documents were also available during the war but were considered by many bookish area experts as possible Due south Vietnam or CIA disinformation--since and then interviews and speeches by communist leaders and the defection of former communist, National Liberation Front end, or Viet Cong loftier officials or officers, have verified their content)
One more bespeak. Equally a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreements that formally ended the Indochina War, Vietnam was officially split into North Vietnam and Southward Vietnam, all be it until Vietnam wide elections were to be held. Equally the possibility of these elections receded and both Hanoi and Saigon took on all the domestic and international functions of permanent governments, South Vietnam was likewise diplomatically recognized past a number of countries and carried out formal diplomatic interaction. Moreover, in the Paris Understanding of 1973 signed with the United states of america, North Vietnam officially recognized the sovereignty of S Vietnam. Thus Due north Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam is treated every bit foreign democide, not domestic.
The kickoff estimates of this democide concern the North's bump-off and execution of South Vietnamese officials (lines 376 to 387), civilians (lines 393 to 406), and both (lines 411 to 426). These estimates embrace many different years and are, where information technology would help in their consolidation, extrapolated for the years 1954 to the terminate of the Vietnam War (lines 388, 407, and 428). A problem is that such killing increased in intensity from the early guerrilla years. To compensate for this over the twenty-one years, I extrapolated the low for just xiv years, the high for 18.
Amongst the all-time of the estimates are those given by Guenter Lewy, themselves based on an error range of plus or minus 25 percent (which yields the depression and high shown with his mid-estimate--lines 379, 395, and 424). When added together these estimates cover the flow 1957 to 1972 (line 413) and their range is contained within the final consolidated one (line 428). I also check this consolidation by summing the separate ones for the officials and civilians (line 432). Clearly there is little difference between the two ways of assessing the democide and a concluding total is adamant as usual (line 433).
Because of the disruption caused past the Tet offensive in 1968, South Vietnam was unable to go on count of assassinations during this catamenia and their number usually practise not announced in the above. I therefore treat them separately (lines 436 to 448).
Other democides by North Vietnam (lines 454 to 459) include the wanton killing of refugees, shelling of Saigon civilian areas, and killing of American and South Vietnamese POWs. Moreover, the Northward Vietnamese were heavily involved in Cambodia and also committed democide there (line 451).
The estimated range of refugees killed in one instance (line 454) may seem relatively loftier simply is probably conservative. Of the 200,000 refugees that fled the Highlands offensive by the Due north in March 1975, only 45,000 made it to Tuy-Hoa. Many of the 155,000 missing were killed by Northward Vietnamese troops; others were captured. Insubordinate highlanders also fired on the refugees, some were mistakenly bombed by regime planes, and nevertheless others may take been run over by fleeing regime vehicles. Some died by drowning and sheer exhaustion. I estimate that of those missing virtually 15 percent to 65 percent, most reasonably around one-third, were slaughtered past the North or died due to their deportment. Because of the size of this missing effigy, I should note that it comes from Phan Quang Dan,
North Vietnamese troops or their guerrilla Viet Cong surely committed more democide than that for which I have been able to find estimates. Throughout the guerrilla menstruation and during the war they shelled and attacked civilians in strategic hamlets and refugee camps, attacked refugees fleeing on the roads in order to create chaos, shelled civilians in most government controlled cities and towns, and purposely mined and booby-trapped civilian areas (as of mining roads traveled by noncombatant buses). Moreover, thousands or tens of thousands were abducted to disappear forever, just are non included here under assassinations and executions. The sources give no estimates of these killings and to leave information technology at this would thus create a large hole in the total democide. Accordingly, I will assume that the boosted deaths from these North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror amounted to at least 200 a calendar month over the xx-one years from 1955 to the end of the war. This seems consistent with both sympathetic and unsympathetic descriptions of Due north Vietnamese and Viet Cong tactics and actions during the war, specially in considering that equally a minimum the 200 dead covers the length and breadth of the unestimated North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror throughout all of S Vietnam for some thirty days.
I can at present total the overall domestic and foreign democide for Due north Vietnam during this menstruum (lines 467 to 472). One estimate presumably of the overall National Liberation Front democide (line 468) is shown for comparing to the sum of North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam (line 467). It is much larger than even the high and is given in the source without explanation, justification, or citation.
Next, I consider the democide by South Vietnamese and others (lines 475 to 621in Table 6.1B). Beginning at that place is that by the South Vietnamese Diem regime (lines 476 to 521). This includes those that died as a result of forced resettlement (lines 476 to 481), arrest and imprisonment (lines 484 to 494), executions and terror (lines 497 to 515), and from South Vietnamese bombing and shelling (line 518). For some of the consolidations or calculations, expiry rates had to be assumed (e.g., line 481). These were based on descriptions in the sources of the associated conditions and bits of information near deaths. In each case I attempted to bracket with the low and loftier what seemed to be the extremes.
Taking all these into business relationship, the Diem democide amounts to sixteen,000 to 167,000 murdered Vietnamese (line 521).
And then I tabulate estimates of democide by the post-Diem regimes. For this the estimates cover much the same categories, but are fuller and apparently more consummate. However, decease rates likewise take to exist assumed (e.m., line 556) in gild to calculate the democide range. I estimate of a massacre in Quang Nam province allegedly by "U.S., boob, satellite troops" is ambiguous and treated as by South Vietnam (line 569). At that place was also South Vietnamese democide during its incursion into Cambodia (line 572). Totaling all this (lines 575 and 576) gives South Vietnamese democide during these years as 42,000 to 118,000 people, most all Vietnamese (line 577).
A particularly controversial and difficult issue is American democide during the war. As clear from the literature this was a subject area of intense propaganda on the one mitt and denial on the other. At that place is no easy way of dealing with this except to study advisedly those presumably more objective mail-war accounts.
Consider first those killed in all Allied bombing and shelling (lines 581 to 589). No doubtfulness some of this violated internationally accepted rules of warfare and those laid downwards by the American command to guide its forces.
Then there are the massacres and atrocities that American forces were found or alleged to have done (lines 595 to 598). Most of these are given in North Vietnam/National Liberation Front documents or by their sympathizers. Some of these did occur, as at My Lai, but for some of the others it is unclear whether civilians killed during legitimate military action are beingness labeled as massacred or not. In any case, the consolidated low and mid-value are such every bit to assume that beyond those massacres we practise know took place there is warrant to some others mentioned (line 601). At that place is simply not enough data to requite a high.
The utilise of defoliation herbicides and potentially dangerous tear gas (which could kill very immature or old civilians caught by the gas in bars areas, such every bit caves or bunkers) did crusade some deaths for which the U.Southward. must be held responsible (lines 604 to 607).
Finally, we must recognize that aside from what was estimated above, at that place was throughout American interest a background of pocket-size level atrocities (such equally the killing of Viet Cong trying to surrender or of innocent peasants simply considering they were running abroad) and massacres (such as wiping out the inhabitants of a village from which a sniper had been firing). Given the extent and nature of this war for Americans, it seems that a low of near 25 Vietnamese and so murdered per calendar month is probably a rock bottom figure, especially because that this is less than one such killing per mean solar day for all American ground activity in all of South Vietnam. This low amounts to 2,000 Vietnamese killed in total (line 610).
Summing these various estimates gives u.s. a total American democide of around 4,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese, or a likely 5,500 (line 613). One way of judging whether this figure is way too depression or high is to look at it as a monthly ratio to American troop forcefulness. For the seven years of war 1965 to 1971, American troop strength averaged 365,571 personnel.
Other Southward Vietnamese allies likewise committed democide, specifically S. Korean troops. Equally with the estimates of American democide, estimates for the Koreans are usually from propaganda issued by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, although in that location is independent evidence that some democide was committed (lines 618 and 620). I gauge a low of 3,000 Vietnamese murdered, which besides takes into account possible democide not given in the sources.
At present I can gather together (lines 624 to 628) and total (line 629) the various estimates of democide past South Vietnam and allies during the Vietnam War and pre-guerrilla menstruum. This sum is then compared to one estimate of democide given by the National Liberation Forepart (line 630) and its extrapolation for the whole period 1954 to war's end (line 632). As can be seen, this estimate is contained within the range (line 629) already determined and which accordingly is taken every bit the final figure (line 633).
Considerable democide followed Hanoi's victory over South Vietnam in 1975. I show estimates of this or related information (lines 637 to 759), the first of which refer to re-instruction camps. To determine some range of deaths in these camps, I had to starting time establish their population. Estimates of this for various periods are shown in the table (line 638 to 668), and consolidated for 1975 to 1980, and 1981 to 1987 (lines 669 and 670). The reason for this periodization is that there were many more inmates during the earlier period and virtually important, this period was more mortiferous. Only one estimate of the number of deaths in the camps is bachelor (line 672). Rather than accept this, even so, I calculated the cost (line 673) based on an assumed death rate that for the early period was in deadliness closer to the Communist Chinese camps than the more lethal Soviet gulag.
Next there are estimates (lines 679 to 683) of the number of forced laborers, including those forcibly deported to "new economic zones," from which consolidation (line 684) we can try to calculate the associated unnatural deaths. This I do (line 687), assuming a very depression annual charge per unit of .75 to 2 percent for the get-go six years and .v percentage thereafter. This also assumes that the zones were about a quarter to a third less deadly then the camps in the early catamenia and half equally deadly after.
Non all democide figures are indirect. Estimates are bachelor on executions (lines 690 to 697), which I consolidate (line 698).
Then there are the boat people for whose deaths at sea Hanoi is responsible. Some of these Vietnamese were forced to flee, some fled out of terror and fearfulness for their lives, some fled by virtue of unlivable atmospheric condition that the communists had created for them. To understand the drive to flee on the dangerous open ocean often in unseaworthy boats is to realize the deadly hazards they faced from the regime, equally discussed in Death By Government. The table lists estimates of the number of Vietnamese boat people that fled or tried to flee (lines 702 to 711) and their consolidation (line 713). Estimates of the percent of these then dying at sea are too given and consolidated (lines 716 to 730), followed by expiry estimates (lines 733 to 748). The consolidation of these (749) gives us one overall range of deaths. I summate another by applying the consolidated percentage mortality to the consolidated number fleeing (line 750). Neither of these totals especially commends itself. In the usual style, I therefore took the everyman low and highest high and averaged the two mid-values to go the terminal range (line 751).
How many of these deaths is the responsibility of the communist Vietnamese, that is, democide? Neither the extremes of "none" or "all" is reasonable. Surely those who were forced to confront expiry at ocean, or risked it out of mortal fear of the government or considering their lives and families had been irretrievably ruined past it, should be counted as democide (by illustration consider that if children fled their family in winter considering they fear being killed or are brutally abused, then dice of exposure in the snow, the parents could exist tried for murder). Yet, those boat people who left for non-vital reasons, such every bit for economical reasons, and died at sea should hardly exist counted as democide. What the proportion is between the two types of refugees is unknown. I assume that those for which the government must be held responsible could vary from one-third to two-thirds, near reasonably a half of them. Applying this to the number who fled yields a likely Vietnam democide of 250,000 boat people (line 753).
As calculated elsewhere in this book, the probable democide that Vietnam committed in Cambodia (line 756) and Laos (line 759) are listed in the tabular array.
Finally, I can calculate the overall democide of Vietnam in the post-Vietnam War menstruation (lines 762 to 764). This amounts to 346,000 to 2,438,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, probably well-nigh 1,040,000.
In order to organize the many different kinds of subtotals and totals that have been calculated in the table, I summarize and collect the various statistics (lines 771 to 838) and at present compare them to estimates of such totals in the sources. First I total the Vietnamese expressionless during the Indochina War (line 775) and then for the Vietnam War and its early guerrilla phase (line 785). The resulting range for N Vietnam (and their surrogate Viet Cong--line 787) brackets the one overall estimate available in the sources (line 786).
Next I give estimates of the overall civilian toll during the Vietnam State of war (lines 791 to 798) and then use their consolidation (line 800) to check the figures I previously calculated, as given by sum of civilians killed in war and all democide during this period (line 802). Equally can be seen, while the high is appropriately higher, the low is over 100,000 greater than the consolidated effigy and raises some question as to the validity of the underlying sub-totals. As a consequence I reviewed the low of all the diverse calculations and consolidations going into this sum and notice each appropriately conservative. The problem lies with that consolidated low based on extrapolating Lewy's guess (line 797) for twelve years. In arriving at his estimate Lewy does not have into account the civilian democide by South Vietnam and Allies nor that by North Vietnam in the Northward; nor does information technology take into account those killed in rebellions in Due south Vietnam. The resulting dead, when added to the civilian war-expressionless determined above (line 800) would add nigh 100,000 to the low and bring it close to the summed low (line 802). I therefore accept the sum without adjustment.
Following this are listed estimates of the overall military and civilian toll (lines 805 to 814). As above, I apply their consolidation (815) as a cheque on the overall sum (line 816) of the diverse calculations and sub-totals for this menstruum. This fourth dimension the whole range (line 816) is as it should be (the low is lower and high higher) and the mid-value is relatively close to the consolidated 1 (this also lends further support to the sum for civilians alone).
With these checks completed, I tin can pull together the diverse sub-totals and totals and present them in a summary manner (lines 823 to 838). In full 3,760,000 Vietnamese probably died of political violence during over forty-2 years (line 831). Some 1,250,000, or over 33 percent of them were murdered. This does not count Laotians and Cambodians killed by Vietnamese governments, virtually all by Hanoi. When these are added and those Vietnamese killed by foreigners subtracted, the total democide by Vietnamese is 1,760,000 people (line 838).
There are still the democide rates to calculate and other statistics to present. For information I list a number of estimates of Vietnamese refugees and consolidate them (lines 841-860). Then I give population estimates for the whole state (lines 864 to 876), North Vietnam (lines 879 to 890), and South Vietnam (lines 894 to 905). I volition employ them to calculate the democide rates (line 908 to 942).
Regarding these, the simply issue is whether to include North Vietnam'south democide in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War every bit domestic or foreign democide. For reasons previously given, I consider Southward Vietnam a separate country during this period and appropriately treat it as strange soil for N Vietnam. Some other issue concerns whether to calculate a democide charge per unit for Due north Vietnam that would include that portion of South Vietnam it controlled (which in 1964 could take been as high as lxxx per centum
NOTES
* From the pre-publisher edited manuscript of Chapter vi in R.J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide, 1997. For full reference to Statistics of Democide, the list of its contents, figures, and tables, and the text of its preface, click volume.1. Vietnam's population for 1967, the mid-yr of the period, was 36,820,000 (UN Demographic Yearbook 1971, p. 135).
2. Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).
3. Chi (1964, p. 166).
4. Rummel (1991, Table IIA.one, lines 378-382).
5. Rummel (1990, p. 28).
6. Particularly, Lewy (1978, p. 341) and Hyman (1992, p. 42).
7. Fall (1966, pp. 188-90).
eight. Run across, for instance, Hosmer (1970), Lewy (1978), Tang (1985), Toai (1990), and Wiesner (1988).
ix. Phan (1988, p. 14).
10. Wiesner (1988, pp. 318-19).
11. I queried Harff and Gurr, the author'south of the approximate, by alphabetic character, just received no response.
12. Among the virtually useful of these I would include Lewy (1978), Andradr (1990), Moss (1990), Wiesner (1988), and Moore (1990)
13. Meet Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).
14. Calculated from Thayer (1985, Table four.iv, p. 34).
15.Run across Rummel (1990, p. 28; 1991, Tabular array IIA.1, lines 378-382
16.Come across O'Neill (1969, p. 7).
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